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Privacy Preserving for Big Data Analysis
by Yohannes Kifle Russom
The Safer@Home [6] project at the University of Stavanger aims to create a
smart home system capturing sensor data from homes into it’s data cluster. To
provide assistive services through data analytic technologies, sensor data has
to be collected centrally in order to effectively perform knowledge discovery
algorithms. This Information collected from such homes is often very sensitive
in nature and needs to be protected while processing or sharing across the value
chain. Data has to be perturbed to protect against the disclosure and misuse
by adversaries. Anonymization is the process of perturbing data by generalizing
and suppresing identifiers which could be a potential threat by linking them with
publicly available databases. There is a great challenge of maintaining privacy
while still retaining the utitlity of the data.
This thesis evaluates various anonymization methods that suits our require-
ments. We present the software requirement specification of an anonymization
framework and provide the practical implementation of a well accepted privacy
preserving anonymization algorithm called Mondrian [7]. To quantify the in-
formation loss during the anonymization process, a framework is proposed to
evaluate the anonymized dataset. Moreover, it proposes the distributed method
for solving the anonymization process using the Hadoop MapReduce framework
to make a scalable system for big data analysis.
1
Introduction
It is expected to see the elderly population to grow rapidly in the coming few
years. If the elderly are going to receive the same treatment and quality of
service as today, the number of professional personnel delivering these services
should be doubled. Often elderly people also prefer to live at home for several
reasons. The efficient way of solving these issue would be to extend the tra-
ditional health care services to residential homes using sensor networks which
monitor the movement and activity of users of the system. There have been vari-
ous research about analyzing sensor from smart home [8–12]. The Safer@Home
project at the University of Stavanger is one of them. This thesis paper is part
of this project which specifically works on preserving the privacy of personal in-
formations. The disclosure of personal information without using proper means
of hidding informations could lead to misuse/abuse of personal information and
be used by third parties for their purpose, for example advertising companies.
Since data collected from users of the system could have personal informations
which could track individuals out of the number of users, it becomes necessary
to devise a software which could anonymize personal information and preserve
its privacy.
1
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To avoid the disclosure of personal informations unique personal identifiers like
personal numbers, social security number or any other unique numbers can eas-
ily be deleted from datasets before releasing them publicly. Does deleting this
unique identifers prevent the disclosure of personal informations from being de-
identified? Personal data can be protected by using cryptographic algorithms to
hide them from adversaries. Can we publish these data to be used by researchers
or analysts? Researchers and analysts require data which is consistent and coher-
ent, encrypting these data with cryptographic algorithms will not give them the
data with their completeness/truthfulness. Other than the unique personal iden-
tifiers, datasets could hold attributes which could be a threat after being linked
with other publicly available data (referred as quasi-identifiers). This data need
to be properly studied on how much information could be discovered by linking
this data with other publicly available informations. A better way of hiding those
unique and joined attributes (quasi-identifiers) from identifying individuals is to
use anonymization methods. Though there are different kinds of anonymization
methods, their central objective is to protect the De-identifyability of individuals
from datasets, and keep the data utility for further studies.
Some companies have inattentively published incorrectly de-identified datasets
in the past years. For example, Netflix is the world’s largest on-line movie rental
service provider with millions of customers. The company uses movie rental
and ranking records to suggest movies to users. Netflix sponsored a data-mining
competition where teams with the best recommendation engine wins [13]. Un-
fortunately privacy concerns were discovered, and if movie recommendations
are combined individuals could be traced. Moreover, AOL has also previously
published a large dataset of their customers’ for search queries, without knowing
that most of the search queries could be traced back to a unique individual via
personalized queries [14]. As a result, many companies and privacy researchers
have been working for different ways of ensuring the best anonymity results
without perturbing the original dataset too much.
Similar problems can occur when private organizations are working with smart
home applications. These organizations use personal informations to process
the number of customers using the smart home application. This thesis paper
specifically studies on how to anonymize the data that is securely collected by
sensors from the patients house. A number of different privacy preserving al-
gorithms have been invented to solve the issues of linking quasi-identifiers that
uniquely identifies customers. But the first issues with such kind of customer
vs service provider issues are to secure the network between the two parties,
storing and processing them. This part of the project is done in my previous
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work, where I proposed a security architecture (Figure 2.1) and show how per-
sonal informations (personal number, age, zip code ...etc) can be processed in
different modules and the other non informations to be processed in different
modules. Beside that the paper clearly explains the different kinds of practical
functional algorithms which have been applicable in the privacy preserving so-
lutions. K-anonymity algorithm perturbs data in a scientifical way. The primary
objective of k-anonymity is to protect the privacy of the individuals to whom the
data pertains. It provides protection by making each row identical to at least k-1
other rows. However, the released data should still remain as "useful" as possi-
ble. Thus it prevents definite database linkages and at worst the data released
narrows down an individual entry to a group of k individuals. Unlike other per-
turbation models, K-anonymity guarantees the data released is accurate.
Smart home applications require a real time sensor response algorithm which
can perform data processing and give response in real time. The previous way
of solving linking problems does not comply with the real time requirement of
smart home applications. Most of the algorithms presented in [15] shows that
k-anonymity algorithms are NP hard. To be able to use privacy preserving for
smart home applications, a real time response is required.
To deal with the real time anonymization system, this thesis proposes the soft-
ware engineering requirements for building an anoymization software and prac-
tical implementation of the latest K-anonymity algorithm called the Mondrian al-
gorithm. The Mondrian algorithm uses the greedy algorithm for K-anonymization
which has a number of advantages over the existing practical algorithms. These
are:
• Greedy algorithms are more efficient than other practical algorithms such
as Datafly, µ-Argus and optimal k-anoymization. The running time of
greedy algorithm is O(nlogn), whereas optimal k-anonymity algorithms
are exponential in the worst case [7].
• Greedy multidimensional algorithm produce higher quality results than the
optimal single-dimensional algorithms, single-dimensional heuristic [[5,
16]] and stochastic search [17] algorithms
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1.0.1 Contribution
Privacy preserving for Big data analyis proposes the software enginnering re-
quirement for building an anonymization software. Presents the design and
implementation of the latest k-anonymity algorithm. To overcome delay in
anonymization process I propose a new way of implementing Mondrian in dis-
tributed way using Hadoop and MapReduce. Last but not least it quantifies the
information loss using different quality metrics and evaluates the results briefly.
The thesis is organized in the following way
Chapter 2. Explains the classification of anonymiziation algorithms and the
need to anonymize datasets.
Chapter 3. Surveys the existing practical K-anonymity algorithms in privacy
preserving data publishing, with a focus on different models of privacy.
Chapter 4. Describes the software requirement specification of anonymization
software.
Chapter 5. Briefly describes the evaluation criteria for quantifying anonymized
datasets.
Chapter 6. Presents the Mondrian algorithm design and implementation steps
that are followed .
Chapter 7. Discuss the results obtained from the practical implementation and
evaluate the information losses.
Chapter 8. Presents the conclusions of the whole master thesis paper and gives
suggestion on how it can be improved in the future works.
2
Background
The Safer@Home project focuses on delivering a non-invasive solution. It anal-
yses movement data based on optical light sensors in a household to recognize
behavioral patterns. Though there exist a number of smart home projects, how-
ever they fail to the privacy and security concerns related with such projects. In
my previous work on the Safer@Home project I have proposed a security archi-
tecture, which gets data from sensors, and classifies them into different modules
based on their attribute type. Those attributes with type Identifiers and sensitive
go to the encrypted identifiers module and the non Identifiers attributes go to the
synonymized module. [15]
As shown in Fig 2.1 the blue dotted line indicates that users with the Doc-
tor/Nurse profile have the access to see data which is queried from the two
modules of the system. The output of those queries is, personal data included
with the rest of the data. This means the profile Doctor/Nurse has the privilege
to see personal identifiers with the rest of their data. But the red dotted line
indicates the Researcher profile. They have limited privileges, so they can only
query data from the set of Synonimized Sensor Data module. Data which is go-
ing to be released for researchers or shared with other organizations will have
to be first anonymized.
5
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FIGURE 2.1: Secure System architecture for collecting data from sensors
There exist a number of different De-identifying anonymity models and tech-
niques, it is important to classify the anonymization algorithms by the problems
they tend to solve. There are three characteristics that can be used to classify
these. Privacy, data models and quality metrics. The privacy models describe
what type of data records are being anonymized, thus data depends on the data
modules, it could be numeric or categorical data. These also show which at-
tributes need to be anonymized before data is published and it can be made
robust against attacks from adversaries with or with out background knowledge.
Quality metrics measure the information loss after the different anonymization
algorithms are applied. Currently, there is no metric that is widely accepted by
the research community [18].
2.1 Privacy
There are different privacy objectives when anonymizing a dataset, These objec-
tives are:
• Unique identity disclosure:
– If data is published there must be no record that could identify an
individual person.
• Sensitive attributes disclosure:
– Adversaries cannot learn any sensitive information about any individ-
ual in the dataset via the disclosed attributes.[19]
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2.1.1 Unique Identity Disclosure
Anonymization on a dataset is meant to protect datasets from disclosure of iden-
tities. Released datasets should not contain attributes which can uniquely iden-
tify a specific person.
Personal data can be shared with other parties or made it publicly available for
research and other purposes. However such disclosure of personal information
raises serious privacy concerns. To avoid such concerns, there are different kinds
of privacy preserving techniques which hide the personal information which can
identify individual uniquely. These techniques can be divided as heuristic and
cryptographic approaches. Heuristic based techniques are designed to work for
centralized data sets, whereas cryptography approaches are for the distributed
scenario. Choosing the appropriate method is most important and crucial. Ef-
ficiency and scalability are the two most important factors for choosing among
the set of privacy preserving algorithms in data mining. The cryptographic al-
gorithm is found to be infeasible for our project as it has an efficiency problem.
Encrypting data attributes increases data privacy it is computationally expen-
sive to apply in big sensor data. Instead, I chose the heuristic based approach.
Because the heuristic based approach can also be used in distributed systems,
provided that issues that could be raised due to security reasons are covered.
In my previous work on the project [15] I have shown the security architecture
which could be used in this scenario.
2.1.1.1 K-anonymity
K-anonymity is one of the algorithms, tailored to solve the problem of iden-
tity disclosure. Samarati and Sweeney proposed a model for privacy protection
called k-anonymity [20]. A dataset satisfies k-anonymity, if every record in the
data set is identical to at least (k−1) other tuples with respect to the set of quasi-
identifier attributes, and such a dataset is so-called k-anonymous. As a result, an
individual is indistinguishable from at least (k−1) individuals in a k-anonymous
dataset. The K-anonymity algorithm limits the ability to link or match published
data with existing external information. Those attributes in the private informa-
tion that could be used for linking with external data are known as the quasi-
identifier. The dataset does not only include explicit unique identifiers such as
personal number, security number but also include attributes such as birth date,
age, ZIP Code and gender [21].
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The important feature of K-anonymity is the protection techniques to preserve
the data integrity and keep the data utility level high. Datasets which are
anonymized reflects the anonymization of the original dataset. There is always
a trade off between privacy and data utility. As data becomes more privacy
preserved, the anonymized data could be less important for further research or
analysis. Whereas if utility is required, then the privacy level has to be little
relaxed to allow data to be used by other parties.
K-anonymity uses the generalization and suppression methods to mask the iden-
tifiability of a unique person from set of data. Generalization is replacing a
value with a less specific data and without losing its meaning. Suppression is the
replacing of original value by some other character or symbol which totaly repla-
cies it. It can be used for replacing unique identifiers [5]. There are a number of
advantages on using both generalization and suppression methods as a means
of perturbing information. One of the most important advantages is that, data
which has been changed using these methods still reflects the original data dis-
tribution. Meaning, data utility is high that these data could be used for further
research or analysis by other parties.
As the name generalization indicates, the process of generalizing attributes is
generalizing values by hierarchies into value which ranges from the minimum to
the maximum value of the attribute, and make each tuples in same level much
alike. Fig 2.2 shows the generalization sequence or a functional generalization
sequence of an attribute birth date. Until the required level of K-anonymity is
achieved, each of the levels of the attribute are the generalized. Fig 2.3 shows
the suppression method for anonymizing the zip code attribute. In each level of
the iteration, the values are made to be equal by changing the last numbers by
’*’. The goal of K-anonymity is how to limit the linking of those personal infor-
mations collected from the sensors with data which are accessible from public
sites. When referring to a table, each row or tuple is an order of n-values <v1 ,
v2 ,...,vn >.
2.1.2 Sensitive Attribute Disclosure
Data which is ready for release should be resistant enough that adversaries could
not link them with information from public. For example , if we have a dataset
of attributes such as Name, Age, Sex, Zip and Disease. The Name and disease
attribute are sensitive ones , because if adversaries have a prior knowledge of
the a persons Name/Disease, they may track down the individual. Protecting
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FIGURE 2.2: Birth date generalization hierarchy level
FIGURE 2.3: Zip code suppression
against sensitive data disclosure is more difficult than protecting against identity
disclosure.
Published data should be prevented from an adversary using publicly available
data in conjunction with a published dataset to discover sensitive data about
Name Age Sex Zip Code
Martha 23 F 4041
Ken 27 M 4045
Linda 65 F 4041
Peter 35 M 4045
TABLE 2.1: Sample: Publicly available data
Attributes 2-Anonymous Sensitive Attributes
Age Gender Zip Code Gender Zip Code Disease
23 F 4041 F 4041 HIV
27 M 4045 M 4045 Diabetic
65 F 4041 F 4041 HIV
35 M 4045 M 4045 Flu
TABLE 2.2: Published data with sensitive attributes
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an individual. For example Table 2.1 contains the public available data. If an
organization releases the data in Table 2.2, an attacker could infer that Linda
was treated for HIV. Because the published dataset with it’s sensitive attributes
have the same value of quasi-identifiers as the publicly available dataset.
Some of the existing K-anonymity algorithms that anonymize based on their
sensitivity and diversity are :
• P-sensitive k-Anonymity extends the features of k-anonymity to prevent
sensitive data disclosure. Each dataset in addition to fulfilling the property
of k-anonymity, the sensitive attribute value must also appear at least p
times in each equivalence class [22].
• Bayes-Optimal Privacy [23] is one of the privacy models known for being
strong. The Bayes-Optimal formulation calculates the privacy loss after
data published as the difference between the prior and posterior beliefs of
a person. Their difference must be minimal.
• l-diversity address the Bayes-Optimal privacy problem that requires each
equivalence class in each attribute has at least l ’well-represented’ value
[23]. For example lets assume we have a group of k different records that
all share a particular quasi-identifier. An attacker cannot identify the in-
dividual based on the quasi-identifiers. But if the adversary is interested
in knowing the sensitive attribute and all the groups have the same value
then the data has leaked. This is called the homogeneity attack. The dis-
tribution of target values within a group is called l-diversity.
2.2 Data Model
One of the key factors in choosing anonymization algorithms is the data model.
Data can be numeric or categorical. Examples of numerical data are such as age,
salary, zip code. It is easier and more precise to anonymize datasets in numeric
than the categorical datasets. Anonymization in numeric can be done using par-
titioning. Whereas categorical datasets are datasets with ranges of values which
are discrete and ordering is not possible but they can be arranged hierarchically.
The tree shows the categorical hierarchies of occupation and how it is general-
ized.
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Occupation
Education
Professor Teacher
Healthcare
Doctor Nurse
FIGURE 2.4: Categorical data type of Occupation
2.3 Quality metrics
Dataset which are anonymized need to be quantified to measure the information
loss during the process of anonymization. There are a number of metrics which
are proposed to quantify the information loss that anonymization introduces into
a dataset. A brief description of quality metrics is given in Chapter 5.
2.4 Hadoop
Hadoop [24] is an open-source Java framework for large-scale data processing
and querying vast amount of data across clusters of computers. It is an Apache
project initiated and led by Yahoo. It is mostly inspired by Googles MapReduce
and GFS (Google File System). Hadoop is immensely used by big companies like
Yahoo, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon.
Hadoop partitions large amounts of data and performs computation across the
nodes in parallel. By using Hadoop we can harness the performance in comput-
ing very large amouns of data and preserve network bandwidth.
Some of the key features of Hadoop are :
• Cost effective: Hadoop computes in parallel commodity servers. This re-
sults in lowering the cost per terabyte of storage, which in turn makes
Hadoop more affordable.
• Scalable: New nodes can be added as per the requirment of the system.
• Flexible: There is no defined schema in Hadoop. It can process any type
of data, whether structured or not from any number of sources. Data from
multiple sources can be merged and aggregated to give fast and reliable
statistical analysis.
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• Fault tolerant If a node stops working the system redirects the work to
another location of the data and pursues its processing without losing any
data.
Under Apache Hadoop there are two main subprojects, which have made the
Hadoop framework much more suitable for practical use. These are: MapReduce
and HDFS (Hadoop Distributed File System).
2.4.1 Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS)
HDFS [25] is a distribued file system which is designed to run in commodity
hardware. It is highly fault-tolerant and can be deployed with low-cost hard-
ware. It has alot of similarities with other distributed file systems. But it has
some features which make it unique. These are HDFS’s [25] write-once-read-
many model that relaxes concurrency control requirements, simplifies data co-
herency, and enables high-throughput access.
2.4.2 MapReduce
MapReduce [24] is a programming model and software framework first devel-
oped by Google (Google’s MapReduce paper submitted in 2004). MapReduce fa-
cilitates and simplifies the processing of big amounts of data in parallel on large-
scale clusters of commodity hardware in a robust, reliable and fault-tolerant
manner. It can handle petabytes of data with thousands of nodes.
MapReduce has two operations [26] :
• A map function, based on a unique key, maps each key with value.
– Input: Key, value
– output: list (Key2, value2)
– Map function −→ Map(Key, Value) −→ Output (list (Key2, Value2))
• . A reduce function, input values are output values of map function
– Input: (key2, list(value2))
– output: −→ (list(key3, value3))
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FIGURE 2.5: Hadoop MapReduce process [1]
Fig 2.5 depicts that HDFS splits the large data files into chunks which are man-
aged by different nodes in the cluster. Each of these chunks are replicated across
several machines to protect from losing data incase a machine failure occurs. For
each of these chunks the mapping process is performed to allocate each record
with key, value pairs. Data is distributed among the different nodes, and later
on sorted and combined by their key value pairs to be reduced to one output.
3
Related Works
In a table T with attributes ranging from A1, A2,...,An, a quasi-identifier is a
minimal set of attributes (Ai,...,Ai+k) where (k  1,...,n) and(1 ≤ i ≤ n). These
records can be joined with external information to re-identify individuals. In
this thesis paper, the choice of quasi-identifier is maintained by the administra-
tor based on the background knowledge.The main foucus is to anonymize the
dataset based on the requirements of the k-anonymity algorithm.
A table T is said to be K-anonymous if every tuple t in T , there exist at least (k−1)
tuples which have the same projection with respect to a quasi-identifier, i.e if we
have a dataset with attributes (A1, A2,...,An), tuples t1Ai1,...,Ail
= tk−1Ai1,...,Ail
. All
those tuples which have same projection of quasi-identifiers are grouped in one,
and they are know as an equivalence class.
I Datafly
The Datafly algorithm is one of the first practical applications of K-anonymity
[5]. The algorithm approaches the K-anonymity by using full-domain gen-
eralization until every combination of the quasi-identifier is at least K times.
Besides the method of generalization, the Datafly algorithm uses suppres-
sion method, which removes some tuples from the anonymous data set [5].
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Following tables 3.1, 3.2 show how the Datafly algorithm performs its gen-
eralization and suppression steps to make data ready for release.
There are a few steps in Datafly: Step 1, constructs the frequency of unique
values in each of the quasi-identifier attributes (Birthdate, Gender, and Zip),
along with the number of occurrences of each sequence. Step 2 is general-
izing values starting from the attributes with the highest frequencies. The
generalizing is a recursive task until the required level of k or less tuples
have distinct sequences in frequency. Step 3 is to suppress those tuples who
have a frequency of less than k. The final step is to construct the table based
on the number of occurences.
Table 3.1, demonstrates the Datafly algorithm having 12 unique tuples with
attributes birth date, gender, zip code and disease (The last tuple shows the
frequence of unique values in each column). The quasi-identifier attributes
are birth date, gender and zip. The domain generalization hierarchy is done
on the attribute of the birth date. Table 3.2 shows tuples with the same
quasi-identifier values are grouped together and at least each group is less
than or equal to K-1. Table 3.3 shows the final 2-anonymous dataset.
Birthdate Gender Zip code No Of Occurs Tuple No
16/05/1971 Male 4041 1 t1
10/08/1971 Male 4041 1 t2
19/05/1971 Female 4041 1 t3
20/04/1971 Female 4026 1 t4
03/05/1970 Female 4026 1 t5
01/10/1970 Female 4026 1 t6
18/05/1970 Male 4026 1 t7
10/03/1971 Female 4029 1 t8
09/08/1970 Male 4029 1 t9
01/07/1970 Male 4029 1 t10
09/02/1975 Male 4026 1 t11
19/03/1975 Male 4026 1 t12
12 2 3
TABLE 3.1: Datafly algorithms table example [5]
II µ Argus
The second practical implementation of k-anonymity was done by the
Statistics Netherlands [5]. The objective of the project was to develop
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Birthdate Gender Zip No Of Occurs Tuple No
1971 Male 4041 2 t1,t2
1971 FeMale 4026 2 t3,t4
1970 Male 4026 2 t5,t6
1970 Male 4026 1 t7
1971 FeMale 4029 1 t8
1970 Male 4029 2 t9,t10
1975 Male 4026 2 t10, t11
3 2 3
TABLE 3.2: Generalized output of original dataset based on quasi-identifiers.
[5]
Birthdate Gender Zip Disease
1971 Male 4041 fever
1971 Male 4041 HIV
1971 Female 4026 bronchitis
1971 Female 4026 obesity
1970 Female 4026 HIV
1970 Female 4026 vomiting
1970 Male 4029 Allergic
1970 Male 4029 Back pain
1975 Male 4026 Cancer
1975 Male 4026 Wheezing
TABLE 3.3: Datafly algorithm k =2, with quasi-identifier Birthdate, Gender,
Zip, final result. [5]
software that protects the disclosure of individuals’ identity from being
recognized in the released data. µ-Argus makes use of the generaliza-
tion and suppression method like the Datafly algorithm, but it operates
in different way. µ-Argus makes use of the k value, assignes values to
each of the attributes in the original table. Values are between 0 and
3, which corresponds to not identifying, most identifying, more identi-
fying and identifying. Then, µ-Argus makes a combination by testing 2-
and 3 combinations of attributes. Those combinations which are not safe
are eliminated by generalizing attributes within combinations and by cell
suppression. Despite the erase of entire tuples like in Datafly, here val-
ues are suppressed at the cell level. Thus, the output of this algorithm
contains the contents of the original data but values could be missing in
some cell locations. Fig 3.3 shows the algorithm of µ-Argus.
IIII Optimal K-anonymity
Optimal K-anonymity is one of the practical methods of K-anonymity al-
gorithms for determining an optimal-anonymization of a given dataset.
An optimal anonymization is one which depersonalize the input dataset
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FIGURE 3.1: µ-Argus Algorithm [2]
as little as possible to achieve k-anonymity, where “as little as possible” is
typically quantified by a given cost metric. There exist several different
cost metrics proposed[ [2, 17, 20, 27] ]. Their aim is to minimize the
amount of information loss resulting from the generalization and sup-
pression operations that are applied to produce the transformed dataset.
The approach used in this algorithm was a bit different than Datafly and
µ-Argus. The differeces can be seen as:
1 Previous proposals start generalizing from the original dataset and sys-
tematically or greedily generalize it into one that is K-anonymous, whereas
the K-optimal algorithm starts with a fully generalized dataset (every
tuple is identical to every other tuple) and systematically specializes
the dataset into one that is minimally K-anonymous.
2 K-optimal algorithm uses a tree-search strategy for cost-based pruning
and dynamic search rearrangement.
3 They proposed data management strategies to reduce the cost of eval-
uating a given anonymization.
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FIGURE 3.2: Optimal K-Anonymity [3]
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Fig 3.2 (a) shows the tree structure of the optimal k-anonymity algorithm.
There are 3 attributes ((d) for admission date, (g) for gender and (a)
age in years). Each node indicates the generalization level for each of
the three attributes. To find the optimal k-anonymity, it starts with the
most suppresed value,<d0,g0,a0>having 70% of the records suppresed
and 0 precision of information loss. At the higher levels the nodes are
more generalized, the suppression goes lower and loss of information
is lowered. Fig 3.2 (b) shows how the optimal K-anonymity algorithm
finds the node with the optimal solution. The optimal value is found by
comparing the value of percentage of suppression and the value of the
precision information loss metric.
Optimal k-anonymity searches through the whole power set to find the
lowest cost. Searching the set of all subsets of a given dataset is a prob-
lem, and it’s an NP-hard problem. To challenge this issue, optimal k-
anonymity uses the search method such as the OPUS framework [28].
OPUS framework is built on top of the set-enumeration search strategy[28]
with a dynamic tree arrangement and cost-based pruning for solving the
optimization problem.
4
Software Requirement Specification
As with any software development process, one of the most important steps in
carrying out a successful software engineering methodology is to identify the
basic requirement of the system. Systems which require security and privacy,
need to follow some standard methodologies to accomplish their goal. There are
a number of software engineering methodologies. Each methodology represents
a different approach to evaluation. The fact that there are so many approaches
in common use simply reflects the fact that no single methodology is ’the best’.
Since this paper of the Safer@Home project is focused on security and privacy
issues, a methodology called PriS is found to be the most relevant of all the
others.
PriS [29] is a security requirements engineering method, which includes pri-
vacy requirements early in the development stage. PriS considers the different
privacy requirement goals that need to be achieved and describes the effect of
privacy requirements and facilitates the identification of the system architecture.
Privacy goals are generated to satisfy the issues of 1) authentication, 2) autho-
rization, 3) identification, 4) data protection, 5) anonymity, 6) pseudonymity, 7)
unlinkability.
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4.1 Basic Requirements
• User Profile: The system has different types of users with different privacy
levels. Thus, the user profile will be given according to their privacy lev-
els. For example doctor profile should have a maximum privacy level with
authorization to access the information without perturbation, whereas a
researcher profile should have less access. The system should be accessible
using a predifined username and a password.
• User Authorization: Users are only allowed to query information based
on their privacy level. Users should be allowed to see or surf anonymized
datasets.
• Anonymization: Data should be anonymized before being published. Fail-
ure of good anonymization could lead to leakage of information or a link-
ing attack could be performed by adversaries.
• Real Time Sensing: The software should accept input data in real time
and anonymize the dataset with the existing datasets to find the minimal
anonymized datasets and respond to end users in real time.
• Privacy: Private data should be anonymized such that adversaries should
not be able to link or re-identify data.
• Data Utility: The data utility should be maintained upon applying the
anonymization process. Users with limited privacy levels will have more
information loss compared with those users that have full authorization.
But the utility of data should be high by using effective anonymization
algorithms and accurate information loss measures.
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FIGURE 4.1: Software anonymization flow diagram [4]
Fig 4.1 depicts the flow diagram of anonymization process. The process starts by
validating end users with already registered users of the system, and forwards
those users that are authenticated. Each of these users is assigned a privacy level
according to their type of security level. To determine which of the attributes
in the original dataset are identifiers, non-identifiers or sensitive attributes, a
separate schema definition is in position to make it easily configurable to the non
fixed requirement of the anonymization requirement. This can be configured by
the administrator based on the anonymization process needed. Thus, using the
privacy level and the schema definition we can anonymize the original dataset to
meet the requirements of the k-anonymity algortihm. Finally, the output of this
process will be different with respect to the privacy level and schema definition.
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4.2 System Requirement
4.2.1 Functional and non-Functional Requirement
ID System Feature Functional Requirements Details
1 Authentication Description: The system shall provide an interface to let
the users type their unique credentials.
Stimulus/Response Sequence: User to enter user name
and password.
• Each of the users shall be assigned privacy levels.
Users with privacy level value of 1 are those with
high security level that can see the original data with-
out perturbation. Those users with limited privileges
have higher privacy level numbers.
2 Real time input dataset The system shall accept input in real time from Hadoop/H-
Base.
3 Real time output Description: The system shall provide appropriate feed-
back to the user in real time.
Stimulus/Response Sequence: User to enter command to
perform an immediate task.
• The system shall provide feedback for a user request
for an instant from the command being issued by the
user.
4 Anonymization Description: The system shall anonymize datasets.
Stimulus/Response Sequence: Anonymizing datasets
based on the privacy level of end user.
• The system shall anonymize input dataset into a min-
imal anonymized dataset.
5 Data utility Description: How much data is changed after anonymiz-
ing original data.
Stimulus/Response Sequence: Minimizing the informa-
tion loss.
• Data which has been anonymized should keep the
integrity and consistency of the original data.
• It should be useful for researchers and analysts.
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6 System Management Description: The system shall provide an interface to let
users type their unique credentials.
Stimulus/Response Sequence: User to enter username
and password.
• The system shall allow only administrators to delete
existing users.
• For a user already logged in, the system shall request
the users password again after the account has been
idle for x number of minutes (configurable within
user preferences).
• The system shall allow only administrator users to
create or modify users.
FIGURE 4.2: Use case model
Fig 4.2 shows the sample of use case model for researchers and doctors. These
two users have a common purpose in searching stored data and processing them
for their specific needs. For each of the two different actors we could have
different privacy levels that are classified under them. For example, a nurse is
grouped under the doctor category where it has privileges lower than the doctor.
Thus, the result for the doctor group could be different for each of those actors
under that category. The same case applies to the researcher case. There could
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be in- house researchers (researchers of data owner organization) and out-of-
house researchers (researchers from other organizations). In-house researchers
have privacy levels more than those of out house researchers.
Fig 4.3 depicts the use case scenario of a doctor or researcher.
• Users log-on on to the system, by entering their credentials.
• Smart Home Application checks if the user is authenticated and the result
is sent to the client browser with information, authorization, privacy levels.
• Based on his/her privacy level, the user requests to query some information
from the database. The results query is the anonymized output of the
original dataset which is de-personalized based on the privacy level of the
user who is requesting the service.
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FIGURE 4.3: Usec case scenario
5
Framework for Evaluating Privacy
Preserving
The aim of having a framework for evaluating privacy preserving data mining
techniques is to preserve the privacy of users while extracting information from
a dataset. Research has indicated that there is no single privacy preserving algo-
rithm which performs all the evaluation criteria of privacy preserving techniques.
Different algorithms require different metrics to quantify their privacy preserving
techniques.
According to [18] the main goals of privacy preserving in data mining (PPDM)
algorithm are:
• After applying PPDM algorithms sensible information must be hidden.
• Have to be resistant to the various data mining techniques.
• It should not compromise the access and the use of non sensitive data.
• It should not have an exponential computational complexity.
Privacy preserving data mining techniques can be evaluated by:
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1 Privacy level: Indicates how much information can still be inferred from the
anonymized information.
2 Hiding failure : Indicates information that are not hidden even after applying
the anonymization algorithm.
3 Data quality: How does data change after the application of PPDM algorithm.
4 Complexity: Ability of privacy preserving algorithm to execute with good
performance in terms of all the resources implied by the algorithm.
For each of these evaluation criteria there exist metrics to quantify their degree
of information loss. The following are metrics of evaluation criteria:
5.0.2 Metrics for Quantifying Privacy level
The measurement of quantifying data privacy is based on the degree of uncer-
tainty, i.e how much information can be inferred based on the original dataset.
The higher the amount of uncertainty achieved by the privacy preserving data
mining algorithm, the better the data privacy is protected by PPDM algorithm.
According to [18] PPDM algorithms can be classified into two main categories:
Heuristic-based approaches and cryptography-based approaches. Heuristic based
approaches are: additive noise, multiplicative noise, K-anonymization and sta-
tistical disclosure.
The objective of anonymization is to protect against the disclosure of personal
data and keep its utility before being made open to the public. The anonymized
data has to be useful for further analysis or research by third parties. K-Anonymization
technique is a heuristic technique we have adopted to make the anonymization
of data sets. It was introduced by Samarati and Sweeney in [5] [27]. A dataset
is anonymous with respect to quasi-identifier attributes if there exists at least k-1
same tuples in the dataset having exact values of quasi-identifier attributes. So
for every dataset T , k-anonymization is performed to produce a new dataset T∗
that guarantees the k-anonymity property for sensitive attributes by generaliza-
tion and suppression on the set of quasi-identifiers. The probability of finding
the individual form set of k will be 1/k. which is the degree of uncertainty.
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5.1 Metrics for quantifying Hiding Failure
Even though privacy preserving techniques have applied to a dataset, there can
be sometimes failure to not anonymize the whole dataset. Those dataset which
can still be discovered shows the hidden failures. K-anonymity is designed to
achieve zero hiding failure. Thus, all patterns potentially sensitive are hidden.
But the more information is hidden the more non-sensitive information will be
missed. So algorithms have to balance between the need to make dataset private
and knowledge to discover from anonymized datasets. Oliveira and Zaiane [30]
calculate hiding failure as the ratio of the sanitized dataset with original dataset:
HF =
#Rp(D′)
#R(pD)
where #RP (D) is the number of restrictive patterns of the original data and
#RP (D′) is for the perturbed data.
5.2 Metrics for quantifying data quality
Privacy preserving algorithms usually modify datasets through insertion of fake
informations or by generalizing and suppressing the original values. It is obvious
to see that the more the data is changed or perturbed the less useful it becomes
for data analysis or researchers. So quantifying the data quality after perform-
ing the anonymization is the most important part of the metrics. There exists
several data quality metrics for quantifying the utility of data after anonymiza-
tion. However there is no specific metric that can be used widely by the research
community. To evaluate the quality of data after the privacy preserving method-
ology is processed it is important to assess both the quality of the data mining
results and the quality of the data resulting from the PPDM process. The result-
ing data after performing the privacy preserving technique can be the evaluating
measurement and the same with the data mining results which evaluates the
change in the information that is extracted from the database after the privacy
preserving process is applied.
The result of data quality metric usually depends on the context in which the
data is used [31]. Data quality not only depends on the privacy preserving data
mining algorithm but also on the structure of the database. The following pa-
rameters are among the most important data quality measurements.
• Accuracy: measures the relation of original data and anonymized data.
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• Completeness: measures how much the anonymized data is changed from
the original data.
• Consistency: measures the relationships that must hold among data items
in a database.
Accuracy measures the information loss after privacy preserving techniques are
applied to the original dataset. The information loss resulting from the operation
can be measured by how much the generalized dataset approximates the original
dataset. The less information that is lost, the better the data quality is. This
depends on the different kinds of privacy preserving data mining algorithms.
To measure the utility of numerical attributes, lets consider a table T with quasi-
identifier (A1, ..., An). If a tuple t = (x1, ..., xn) is generalized to a tuple
t′ = ([y1−, z1], ..., [yn−, zn1]) such that yi ≤ xi ≤ zi(1 ≤ i ≤ n). Then normalized
certainity penalty (NCP) of tuple t on attribute Ai is defined by:
NCPAi(t) =
zi−yi
|Ai| where | Ai |= maxtT t.Ai −mintT t.Ai [32]
This matematical formulation measures how much tuple t is generalized on at-
tribute Ai in terms of the generalized interval size [32, 33]. Tuples with interval
size smaller have the higher accuracy when they are queried. The sum of all
the inveral size on all the quasi-identifier attributes of the generalized tuples
measures the certainity penalty. The total certainity penalty of the generalized
dataset is the sum of certainity penalty of all the tuples.
Utility measures for categorical attributes follows the hierarchial tree structure as
shown in our previous example of occupation. These trees specify the attribute
values with different granularity. Suppose a tuple t has value v on categorical
attribute Ai, v is generalized to a set of values v1,...,vm in the hierarchy tree. To
measure the generalization quantitatively :
NCPAi(t) =
| ancestor(v1...vm) |
Ai
[33]
In categorical, NCP measures how much tuple t is generalized on Ai in terms of
the number of distinct values the generalized value covers [33].
For both numerical and categorical attributes, the weighted normalized certain-
ity penality is given by :
NCP (t) =
n∑
i=1
(wi.NCPAi(t)), where
n∑
i=1
wi = 1 [33]
To find the weighted normalized certainity penalty for the whole table T it is
defined by:
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NCP (T ) =
∑
tT
NCP (t)
From these two matematical formulas we can conclude that NCP(t) is the weighted
sum of the normalized certainity penalty on all attributes. But to find the cer-
tainity penalty on the whole table we take the sum of the penalty on all the
tuples.
Based on the NCP metric a new metric is discovered which is called Global
Certainity Penalty (GCP). This metric measures the information loss in the whole
perturbed dataset. Suppose P is the set of all equivalence classes in the published
anonymized dataset. GCP is defined by :
GCP (P ) =
∑
GP
| G | .NCP (G)
d.N [34]
Where G denotes the equivalence class, N is the number of total records in the
original dataset and d is the dimensionality of quasi-identifier. This measures
the information loss among the tables with varing dimensionality and cardinal-
ity. The value of GCP is between 0 and 1, where 0 signifies that there is no
information loss and 1 corresponds to total information loss or the number of
equivalence classes is only one covering all the records of the original dataset.
Classification metric is also another information loss measurement introduced by
Iyneger [17] to optimize a k-anonymous dataset for training a classfier. Classifi-
cation metric measures the information loss by adding the individual penalities
for each tuple in the table normalized by the total number of rows in N . It is
matematically give by :
CM(T∗) =
∑
all rows
penalty(row r)
N
The value of r is 1 if it’s penalized or if it is suppresed. Otherwise, the penalty
value of row r is 0.
Bayardo and Agrawal [35] proposed another metric called the discernibility met-
ric (DM). The discernibility metric assigns penality to each tuple based on how
many tuples in the transformed dataset are indistinguishable from it. In a global
recoding scheme, suppressed entries are assigned a cost equal to the size of the
dataset. The cost of anonymization is the sum of all the anonymization cost in
the tuples:
CDM =
∑
eE
| x |2 + | S || D | [7]
Where E is the set of all equivalence classes, S is the set of suppressed entries
and D is the original dataset.
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For example Let t be a tuple from the original table T , and let GT ∗ (t) be the set
of tuples in an anonymized table T indistinguishable from t or the set of tuples
in T equivalent to the anonymized value of t. Then discernibility metric (DM)
is defined as follows:
DM(T∗) =
∑
|GT ∗ (t)|
Tuples which are suppressed tend to lose more information, so it’s better to avoid
the practice of tuple suppression. For example if the tuple t is suppressed, the
size of GT ∗ (t) is the same size as the size of T∗.
6
Design and Implementation
6.1 The Mondrian algorithm Explanation
Mondrian is a multidimensional k-anonymity algorithm that anonymizes data
through recursively partitioning using the quasi-identifier attribute dimensions
with a median-partition methodology. This model is very fast, scalable [32] and
it produces better results than most other recoding models [16].
The Mondrian algorithm as shown in fig 6.1 uses strict partitioning and relaxed
partitioning methods instead of domain generalization or value generalization
methods. These methodologies enable Mondrian to have a higher data utility
result with lower runtime cost than the older implementations of k-anonymity.
A greedy algorithm approach is used to partition the original dataset into an
equivalence class less with size than 2k − 1 by recursively partitioning on the
median of the quasi-identifier attribute with the largest normalized range in the
equivalence class.
A dataset contains a number of rows where each row is represented by a tuple T .
The dataset is made up of several attributes, which are composed of identifiers,
quasi-identifiers and non-identifiers. Our main concern here is the attributes of
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FIGURE 6.1: Mondrian Algorithm
quasi-identifiers. If we have d quasi-identifiers, then we need a d dimension
representation of Mondrian.
Fig 6.2 depicts the flow diagram of the Mondrian algorithm, where it starts with
input of some dataset made up of set of tuples where each tuple represents a
patient record. Using the quasi-identifier attributes the algorithm classifies the
tuples into equivalence classes. Assume a table T consist of a multi set of tuples.
An equivalence class for T with respect to the quasi-identifier attributes Q1...Qd
is the set of all tuples in T containing identical values (x1, ..., xd) for (Q1 ...Qd).
Since there could be many equivalence classes in a table, they will be represented
as list of equivalence classes. Each of these equivalence classes in the list, needs
to be partitioned based on the dimension with the largest normalized range at-
tribute. These dimensions could be multi-dimensional or single-dimension. The
input indicated by the name “choose dimension” signifies which quasi-identifier
to be used in order to perform the partitioning. This means if we have d quasi-
identifiers we have to perform partitioning based on all the d quasi-identifiers.
If the result of the partitioning is still bigger than the value of the 2k − 1 value,
we keep partitioning the equivalence class until it becomes less than the size of
2k − 1. There are two types of partitioning algorithms in Mondrian, the relaxed
and the strict partitioning. The Strict partitioning uses dimension to partition
the equivalence class on the median. Each value of dimension less than the me-
dian is partitioned into the left tree and for values greater than the median to
the right of the tree. Where as relaxed partitioning uses dimension to partition
the equivalence class in the median, but the division is into left, center and right
partition. Values which are equal to the median will be allocated in the center
node.
Strict Multidimensional Partitioning [7] defines a set of non-overlapping multidi-
mensional regions that coverDQ1...DQd. φmaps each tuple (x1, ..., xd)DQ1...DQd
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FIGURE 6.2: Mondrian algorithm flow diagram implemenation
to a summary statistic for the region in which it is contained, where φ is a func-
tion.
Relaxed Multidimensional Partitioning [7] for relation T defines a set of (po-
tentially overlapping) distinct multidimensional regions that cover DQ1...DQd .
Local recoding function φ * maps each tuple (x1, ..., xd) T to a summary statistic
for one of the regions in which it is contained. This relaxation offers an extra
degree of flexibility. For example, consider generating a 3-anonymization of Pa-
tients, and suppose Zip code is the single quasi-identifier attribute ranging from
53710 to 53712 . Using the strict model, we would need to recode the Zip code
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value in each tuple to [53710 − 53712]. Under the relaxed model, this recoding
can be performed on a tuple-by-tuple basis, mapping some occurrences of 53711
to [53710− 53711] and some other occurrences to [53711− 53712].
Mondrian algorithm uses the same approach as the KD-Tree approach to plot
the d dimension of quasi-identifiers and find the range of the points and gen-
eralization. A KD-Tree is a data tree similar to Binary Space Partitioning Tree
in funcitionality. A KD-Tree partitions the data to generate an evenly balanced
tree, with each leaf partition containing an approximately equivalent number of
objects.
The following dataset shows the partitioning process of Mondrian algorithm:
Name Age Sex Zip Code
Bob 23 M 11000
Ken 27 M 13000
Linda 65 F 25000
Alice 65 F 25000
Peter 35 M 59000
Sam 59 M 12000
Jane 61 F 54000
Mandy 70 F 30000
Jane 62 F 54000
Moore 79 F 30000
TABLE 6.1: A sample dataset with ten tuples
FIGURE 6.3: Steps 1 and 2
The first Figure in 6.3 shows the plotting of the original dataset into the 2-
dimensional quasi-identifier dataset (Age and zip code). The process starts by
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partitioning in the y-axis because the normalized range is bigger than the x-axis,
resulting in two regions. Since the number of points in each of the regions are
more than 2k − 1 partioning need to be performed again upon the two newly
formed tables. (For this example a point is considered as a tuple).
FIGURE 6.4: Steps 3 and 4
6.2 Mondrian Anonymization Models
The process started on Fig 6.3 continues until the number of points is less than
2k−1 , where k is a postive constant number. The second Figure in 6.4 shows the
final minimal representation of the Mondrian recursive partitioning algorithm
resulting in smaller regions.
All anonymization algorithms use generalization and suppression to transform
the original datasets into anonymous datasets. The previous algorithms from
the background section show that these anonymization techniques use the do-
main generalization and value generalization. Whereas the Mondrian algorithm
uses two different approaches of generalization and suppression. These two dif-
ferent approaches are Global recoding and Local recoding. The Mondrian algo-
rithm implemented with global recoding tends to maintain the consistency of the
dataset, whereas the Mondrian algorithm implemented with local recoding give
higher utilities. The Mondrian algorithm uses the top down model approach.
This method first takes the whole dataset as an equivalence class or group. The
data utility of the table is minimal since all tuples are generalized to the same
equivalence class or group. It then recursively partitions each group into two. If
each subset contains at least k tuples, the utility is improved because the degree
of generlization is minimal. The algorithm stops when further partitioning leads
to the violation of the k-anonymity.
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6.2.1 Global Recoding
Datasets which are anonymized by global recoding have all the attributes gener-
alized or suppressed equally to all the entries. If different tuples have the same
value of an attribute, this value will be mapped to the same generalized value,
for example if a tuple has an age attribute with value “50” then it can only map
to the same interval [40-50].
Global recoding can be categorized as single-dimensional recoding or multi-
dimensional recoding. Single-dimensional global recoding is defined by a func-
tion fi: DXi → D for each attribute Xi of the quasi-identifier. Anonymization
value can be obtained by applying the function fi to the values of the quasi-
identifiers Xi in each tuple of the original dataset. Whereas multidimensional
global recoding is defined by a single function f : DX1 ∗ ... ∗ DXn → D, the
anonymized value is obtained by applying the function f to the vector of quasi-
identifiers in each tuple of the original dataset.
6.2.2 Local Recoding
Unlike global recoding, local recoding suppresses attributes on a per-cell basis.
This will result in a dataset with less data suppressed than the global recoding.
The data space is partitioned into different regions and all records in the same
region are mapped to the same generalized group. Since the bounds on the
solution quality are big enough it’s not easy to prove the generalization given
the optimal solution. The global recoding has a state space of 2k, whereas, local
recoding has state space of 2nk.
A global recoding achieves anonymity by mapping the domains of the quasi-
identifier attributes to generalized or altered values [36]. Whereas, local recod-
ing models map (non-distinct) individual data items to generalized values. The
advantage of global recoding is that the anonymized table will have a homoge-
neous set of values while the disadvantage is that it completely over-generalize
the orignal table and results in a large amount of information loss in the pro-
cess. Whereas, local recoding gives much better results in real practice and it
has much more utility than the global recoding methodology.
In Safer@Home though, both privacy and utility is important, Since we are look-
ing for data to be processed by third parties like doctor, nurses and researchers,
giving invalid or more generalized values could lead to data which doesn’t rep-
resent the real picture of our customers data. For this reason it is designed
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and implemented the local recoding methodology to develop my Mondrian al-
gorithm.
To illustrate the main difference between these methods lets take a simple ex-
ample.
Considering Table 6.2, Attributes Age and Zip Code are quasi-identifiers. Table
6.3 and Table 6.4 are 3 anonymous tables generated by the two methods of
Mondrian algrorithm global recoding and local recoding respectively. The Age
attribute in the global recoding has one big range [54-62], whereas in local
recoding it has two groups [54-60] and [60-62]. Global recoding has a full
range in the domain and it is the most generalized value, while local recoding
has more specific information about Age and Zip Code.
6.3 Class Diagram
Fig 6.5 show the class diagram of anonymization and information loss. The
basic building class of this has been adopted from [37]. I have extended those
classes to include anonymization models for both the Mondrian and Optimal
K-anonymity.
According the specification given in Chapter 5 the class diagram shows that, new
anonymization algorithms can be easily pluged in and extend to impelement
efficient anonymizaiton algorithms which may come in future.
Age Zip Code Disease
54 4041 Flu
55 4042 Flue
60 4043 Diabetic
60 4044 AIDS
62 4045 HIV
62 4046 influenza
TABLE 6.2: Example: A dataset with 10 tuples
Age Zip Code Disease
[54-62] [4041-4043] Flu
[54-62] [4041-4043] Flue
[54-62] [4041-4043] Diabetic
[54-62] [4041-4043] AIDS
[54-62] [4041-4043] HIV
[54-62] [4041-4043] influenza
TABLE 6.3: global recoding
Age Zip Code Disease
[54-60] [4041-4043] Flu
[54-60] [4041-4043] Flue
[54-60] [4041-4043] Diabetic
[60-62] [4044-4046] AIDS
[60-62] [4044-4046] HIV
[60-62] [4044-4046] Influenza
TABLE 6.4: local recoding
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• AbstractAlgorithm: This class is the fundamental class which defines the
quasi-identifiers, ranges of attributes and calculate information loss.
• Tuple:is a class which represents a row data and recursively builds the
whole dataset.
• EquivalenceClass: Each tuple is grouped based on the quasi-identifiers
range into equivalenceClasses.
• EquivalenceList: represents the equivalences classes in lists. Each dataset
is represented in one equilence list.
• Mondrian-Anonymization: This class implements the Mondrian multidi-
mensional algorithm. It uses the local recoding method to anonymize the
dataset.
• Mondrian-InformationLoss: is a class which quantifies the information
loss of anonymized datasets.
• Optimal-Anonymization: a class which implements the anonymizaiton of
Optimal K-anonymity algorithm.
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FIGURE 6.5: Mondrian class diagram implementation
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6.4 Parallelizing Mondrian k-anonymity algorithm
Mondrian works in a top down manner and the main idea in parallelizing it is to
split each dataset in to two equally sized datasets (when I say a dataset I mean a
set -or a List- of tuples and not the whole dataset). This means that at first step
the input of the algorithm is one huge set containing every tuple and the output
is two equally sized partitions, say t0 and t1. At the second step t0 is partitioned
again in two other partitions (say t00 and t01) and t1 is also partitioned as well
(say to paritions t10 and t11). This creates a tree-like structure of recursions,
until each created parition contains less than 2k − 1 tuples.
My proposal here is to model each level of this "tree" as a separate map reduce
job. This means that at the aforementioned second step, we should create one
map reduce job with two tasks dealing with t0 and t1 simultaneously (which
will then create t00, t01, t10, t11). This approach is much better than creating
one MapReduce job for each input set (like 1 MapReduce job for t0 and another
one for t1) because input partitions are created very fast (exponentially actually)
and the performance of our application could be compromised. Fig 6.6 illustrates
the implementation of Mondrian algorithm using the MapReduce framework.
FIGURE 6.6: Parallelizing Mondrian using MapReduce framework
To parallelize the Mondrian k-anonymity algorithm using the MapReduce frame
work, lets consider the different steps of the algorithm into different modules.
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6.4.1 Sorting
The first module is to sort the datasets based on the quasi-identifier sets.
Map Step: The input dataset is stored on HDFS in the format of < key, value >
pairs, each of which represents a record in the data set. The key is combination
of the quasi-identifiers and the value is content of the tuple. The data set is split
and broadcasted to all mappers. The pseudo code of map function is shown in
Algorithm 1. We can set the input parameters like quasi-identifiers, privacy level
(K) to the job before the map function invoked.
Input: (key1: quasi-identifiers; value1: text of a record)
Output: key2: a string representing a cell, value2: the value in current
dimension
Parse the string value ;
Set string outKey and outValue as null;
key← set of quasi-identifiers;
value← value in current dimension;
outKey← sorted key based on quasi-identifiers;
outValue← data[currentDimension];
output(outKey, outValue);
Algorithm 1: Map pseudo code
Reduce Step: The input of the reduce function is the result obtained from the
map function as output. Since the objective of this MapReduce programme is to
sort the input data, the Reduce function does only operate as a combiner.
Input: (key2: a string representing a cell, value2: the value in current
dimension)
Output: key3:text, value3: the value in current dimension
outKey← sorted key based on quasi-identifiers;
outValue← data[currentDimension];
output(outKey, outValue);
Algorithm 2: Reduce pseudo code
Algorithm 2 shows that the reduce programe combines the input from the map-
per based on their key and gives a sorted dataset as an output.
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6.4.2 Recursive MapReduce
As shown in fig 6.6 each dataset is partitioned recursively into two equal sized
datasets. This iteration goes until each of the tables size is less than or equal
to 2k. The choice of the partition is based on the median of the quasi-identifier
with the biggest range. During the Map phase of this recursion, input datasets
have a privacy level as input parameter to check if the required level of privacy
is met. Inputs are read recursivley and sort them based on their key and hand
it to the Reduce phase. In the Reduce module, range of the quasi-identifiers is
calculated inorder to find the median partitioner.
Input: (key1: quasi-identifiers; value1: text of a record; privacy level k)
Output: key2: a string representing a cell, value2: the value in current
dimension
Parse the string value ;
Set string outKey and outValue as null;
key← set of quasi-identifiers;
value← value in current dimension;
outKey← sorted key based on quasi-identifiers;
outValue← data[currentDimension];
output(outKey, outValue);
Algorithm 3: Recursive map psedo code
Algorithm 3 shows the regular Map algorithm with input from the previous
sorted dataset.
In Hadoop each MapReduce programme perform a partitioning process. Parti-
tioning is the process of partitioning the key space to determine which reducer
instance will process which intermediate keys and value. All keys which are the
same goes to the same reducer.
As show in Fig 6.1 the Mondrian algorithm partitiones the dataset using the
median of the attribute with the largest range. The explicit partioner of the
Hadoop MapReduce frame works has to be changed to a custom partioner and
set the median as a partitioner.
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Input: (key3: quasi-identifiers; value3: text of a record; privacy level k)
Output: key4: a string representing a cell, value4: the value in current
dimension
dimension = chooseDimension() ;
splitVal = findMedian(dimension) ;
ltable = (t  partition : t.dim ≤ splitVal) ;
rtable = (t  partition : t.dim ≥ splitVal) ;
outKey← key of table;
outValue← value of table (left/right);
output(outKey,outValue ) ;
Algorithm 4: Custom partitioner
The ouput of algorithm 4 is two tables (those with quasi-identifier attribute less
than the median value to the left table and the others to right table).
Input: (key5: quasi-identifiers; value5: text of a record; privacy level k)
Output: (key6: a string representing a cell, value6: the value in current
dimension)
if dataset size ≤ 2K − 1 then
Initialize ïnˇC´oat numbers max=Float.MIN VALUE, min=Float.MAX VALUE
and split=0 to record the maximum, minimum ;
while (value.hasNext()) do
get value.next named tuple ;
if (tuple > max) then
max =tuple ;
end
if (tuple < min) then
min =tuple ;
end
outKey← sorted key based on quasi-identifiers;
outValue← data[currentDimension];
replace the selected numerical quasi-identifier by [min-max]
value
end
output(outKey, outValue) ;
end
else
Parse the string value ;
Set string outKey and outValue as null;
key← set of quasi-identifiers;
value← value in current dimension;
outKey← sorted key based on quasi-identifiers;
outValue← data[currentDimension];
output(outKey,outValue );
end
Algorithm 5: Recursive Map
Design and Implementation 46
In Algorithm 3 we first check the input dataset if it satisfies the k-anonymity re-
quirment of 2k − 1 size. For those dataset with size less than 2k − 1 we start
to anonymize the datasets by taking the maximum and minimum value of the
attribute and change the explicit value by min-max value. Otherwise, the parti-
tioning of the table countinues.
7
Results and Evaluation
In this section, I will evaluate both the anonymization and information loss mod-
els. I have used two datasets to show how we can achieve the required perturbed
data and quantify the information loss based on the metrics discussed in Chapter
5. Unlike the existing papers of K-anonymity, this experiment does not compare
the different algorithms of K-anonymity. Papers [7, 32, 34] show this compari-
son, and they have concluded that Mondrian multidimensional recoding method
results are better in both utility and information loss. Thus, all results presented
in this thesis paper are a result of the Mondrian multidimensional algorithm.
Throughout the experiment, 2-dimensional attributes are taken as a set of quasi-
identifiers. All algorithms are implemented in Java and the experiments were
run on a Dell Insipiron 15R with 3.8GB of memory and Intel CoreTM i5 CPU M
460 @ 2.53GHz x 4.
The first dataset is the famous Adult dataset from the UC Irvine machine learning
repository [17]. The second dataset is a sample dataset that I have generated for
demonstrating how the anonymization process perturbs the original dataset to a
2K − 1 anonymous dataset. In this thesis report I have included only these ten
tuple sample records results for demonstration purposes. Because the size file
of the anonymized data of UC Irvine machine learning repository is too big to
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be included in this thesis report, I haven’t included it here. The anonymization
of all UC Irvine machine learning repository can be found on the CD/DVD given
with the Master thesis paper.
7.0.3 Anonymization
Input
Name Age Sex Zip Code Disease
Bob 23 M 11000 Pneumonia
Ken 27 M 13000 Dyspepsia
Linda 65 F 25000 Gastritis
Alice 65 F 25000 Flu
Peter 35 M 59000 Dyspepsia
Sam 59 M 12000 Pneumonia
Jane 61 F 54000 Flu
Mandy 70 F 30000 Bronchitis
Jane 62 F 54000 Flu
Moore 79 F 30000 Bronchitis
Kjetil 30 M 12000 Flu
Stephen 54 F 13000 Bronchitis
TABLE 7.1: Random sample dataset
Table 7.1, shows the original sample dataset with quasi-identifiers (Age, Gender
and Zip Code), with K = 2, the Mondrian multidimensional algorithm partitions
these attributes into the minimum cut to allow 2k− 1 tuples in each equivalence
class. Each equivalence class is represented by the range from minimum and
maximum values. Attributes with unique identifiers such as Name (if we con-
sider it to be a unique identifier) will suppressed to a value ∗ in each of the tu-
ples. Table 7.2 shows the local recoding of 2-anonymization for Table 7.1, some
tuples overlap over the range of others, for example tuple t5, t6 and t7 have a
range of [59− 65] and tuples from t8, t9 and t10 have the range of [62− 79].
7.0.4 Utility Measure
The Adults dataset from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository is mostly
used to compare the different kinds of K-anonymity algorithms. The dataset
contains anonymous census data of 32562 individuals from the 1990 US census.
The following shows the fields represented in the set.
• Age: numeric
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Name Age Sex Zip Code Disease
* [23-27] M [11000-25000] Pneumonia
* [23-27] M [11000-25000] Dyspepsia
* [35-61] F [30000-59000] Gastritis
* [35-61] F [30000-59000] Flu
* [35-61] M [ 30000-59000] Dyspepsia
* [59-65] M [11000-25000] Pneumonia
* [59-65] F [11000-25000] Flu
* [59-65] F [11000-25000] Bronchitis
* [62-79] F [30000-59000] Flu
* [62-79] F [30000-59000] Bronchitis
* [62-79] M [30000-59000] Flu
* [62-79] F [30000-59000] Bronchitis
TABLE 7.2: Result of anonymizing 7.1
• Employment type: Private, Self-emp-not-inc, Self-emp-inc, Federal-gov,
Local-gov, State-gov, Without-pay, Never-worked.
• Final sampling weight: numeric
• Education: Bachelors, Some-college, 11th, HS-grad, Prof-school, Assoc-
acdm, Assoc-voc, 9th, 7th-8th, 12th, Masters, 1st-4th, 10th, Doctorate,
5th-6th, Preschool.
• Years of education: continuous
• Marital status: Married-civ-spouse, Divorced, Never-married, Separated,
Widowed,Married-spouse-absent, Married- AF-spouse
• Occupation: Tech-support, Craft-repair, Other-service, Sales, Exec-managerial,
Prof-specialty,Handlers-cleaners, Machine-op-inspect, Adm-clerical, Farming-
fishing, Transport-moving, Priv-house-serv, Protective-serv, Armed- Forces.
• Relationship: Wife, Own-child, Husband, Not-in-family, Other-relative,
Unmarried
• Sex: Female, Male
• Capital gain: continuous
• Capital loss: continuous
• Hours worked per week: continuous.
• Native country: United-States, Cambodia, England, Puerto-Rico, Canada,
Germany, Outlying-US(Guam-USVI- etc), India, Japan, Greece, South, China,
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Cuba, Iran,Honduras, Philippines, Italy, Poland, Jamaica, Vietnam, Mex-
ico, Portugal,Ireland, France, Dominican-Republic, Laos, Ecuador, Taiwan,
Haiti, Columbia,Hungary, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Scotland, Thailand, Yu-
goslavia, El-Salvador,Trinidad and Tobago, Peru, Hong, Holland- Nether-
lands
Attribute Description Type
Age Age of respondent Continuous
Final Sampling weight sample weight Continuous
• 39, State-gov, 77516, Bachelors, 13, Never-married, Adm-clerical, Not-in-
family, White, Male, 2174, 0, 40, United-States, <=50K
• 50, Self-emp-not-inc, 83311, Bachelors, 13, Married-civ-spouse, Exec-managerial,
Husband, White, Male, 0, 0, 13, United-States, <=50K
• 38, Private, 215646, HS-grad, 9, Divorced, Handlers-cleaners, Not-in-family,
White, Male, 0, 0, 40, United-States, <=50K
• 53, Private, 234721, 11th, 7, Married-civ-spouse, Handlers-cleaners, Hus-
band, Black, Male, 0, 0, 40, United-States, <=50K
I assume the Age and Final sampling weight are the set of quasi-identifiers with
numerical values. The anonymization process for the categorical values can be
approached in a similar way. In the categorical types, each attribute values could
be represented by hierarchical levels where each level could be an integer value.
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The normalized certainty penalty measures the utitlity of anonymized dataset.
Fig 7.1 depicts the summation of normalized range of equivalence classes with
high privacy (low value of k) have the higher normalized certainity penality than
those with low privacy. Eventhough, the normalized range of each equivalence
classes in high privacy is small, the number of tuples in each equivalence group
are high that their summation is larger than than the normalized range of equiv-
alence classes in lower privacy (high value of K).
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FIGURE 7.2: Global Certainty penalty with respect to K (privacy Level ), on
datsets with distribution (N = 32000) and 2 quasi-identifier attributes
Global Certainty Penalty (GCP) measures the information loss over the entire
anonymized table as a value from 0 to 1. A value of 0 represents zero information
loss, and a value of 1 represents total information loss. Figure 7.2 shows the GCP
of our anonymized UC Irvine machine learning dataset with different privacy
levels (k). The result shows that, as the privacy level increases, so does the
GCP. At a privacy level of 25, there is around 15% information loss, and as the
privacy level increases to 100, the information loss doubles to 30%. This growth
in information loss is due to the fact that there are less equivalence classes as k
increases, leading to more generalized attributes. Users such as doctors have a
very low value of k, and they get information which is not perturbed with 100%
data utility.
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FIGURE 7.3: Discernability penalty with respect to K (privacy Level ), on dat-
sets with distribution (N = 32000) and 2 quasi-identifier attributes.
Discernability metrics measures the cardinality of the equivalence class. For a
low value of K the cardinalty of equivalence is too small. If the privacy level is
high (high value of K) the discernability metric increases sharply which increase
the cardinalty of an equivalence class. Equivalence classes with large cardinalty
tend to group datasets in large range leading to large information loss. Fig 7.3
presents the discernability penalty of 32000 records.
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Fig 7.4 shows the time it takes to complete the anonymization of 32000 records
with 2 quasi-identifiers in the UC Irvine data was almost steadily constant until
k=50. For larger value of k, the running time starts to increase sharply. Because
the number of equivalence class are small in size and the ranges are getting
bigger. It takes more time to process each of these large equivalence classes than
those equivalence classes with large intervals.
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FIGURE 7.5: Scalability with respect to database size,on synthetic data sets
with uniform distribution (dimensionality=2, k=10).
Fig 7.5 depicts that the scalability of the system with the data size to be anonymized.
This experiment shows a fixed privacy level (K) 10 and with two quasi-identifiers.
The result shows that the time it takes to anonymize a dataset of 5000 tuples or
less tuples are almost similar, but as the dataset gets bigger the time it takes to
complete the anonymization increases steadily. Thus, our anoynimization input
dataset will have a strong effect on the performance of anonymization.
8
Conclusions
8.1 Conclusion
Concerns over the privacy of personal information has grown in the last few
years. In order to overcome these problems, it is essential that a solution is
devised. This solution must use efficient and effective data anonymization tech-
niques. K-anonymization is one of the most extensively used techniques for data
anonymization. K-anonymization works by making each tuple in a data set iden-
tical to at least k-1 other tuples.
In order to build software related to anonymization of data sets, the software
must be thoroughly checked to make sure it can stand up against possibly se-
curity related attacks. To do this, the first step is the creation of a requirement
specification. The Mondrian algorithm is a multidimensional partitioning algo-
rithm − one kind of K-anonymity algorithm − is the second step, which I have
implemented and discussed throughout this thesis paper. Finally, the implemen-
tation of Mondrian in a distributed way is presented as an algorithm.
To ensure that the required level of privacy has been achieved by an anonymiza-
tion implementation and to evaluate anonymized data sets, an evaluation frame-
work has also been discussed. Based on these evaluation metrics, the privacy
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and information loss in a data set are quantified. The results proved that as
the privacy level of users is low, the anonymization results in more information
loss than those with high privacy level. The running time of anonymization also
depends on the size of data and cardinality of the datasets.
In conclusion, the Mondrian anonymity technique is capable of anonymizing
data to a reasonable level of privacy while still retaining the data utility. For a
researcher with a privacy level of k=25, the loss of information is as low as 15%
and for those with high privacy such as a doctor the loss of information is as low
as 0%. This proves to us that the Mondrian algorithm can provide us privacy
and utility.
8.2 Future Work
Although this thesis presented anonymization techniques and a framework for
quantifying the information loss, there are several conditions that could be stud-
ied in the future.
It is important to study the risk of re-identifing individual if adversaries have
some knowledge of the original dataset. Risk evaluation could give an insight
into how much information adversaries could dig out. This could help us to
prepare against such attacks and help us to choose the safest anonymization
parameters such as the set of quasi-identifiers, and the privacy level of users.
The anonymization process is limited by the assumptions I made on the type of
quasi-identifier (numeric) and selection of two quasi-identifier attributes. This
could be expanded to include the anonymization of categorical attributes and
support for more than two quasi-identifiers.
Last but not least, It would be interesting to prepare a graphical user interface
for the process of anonymization, utility evaluation, and risk evaluation through
the use of bar charts and histograms.
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